What is the value of surveys during electoral campaigns, asks Dieter Roth. He refuses the argument of accidental voting decisions. Voting is result of a complex decision process, oriented basically on three criteria: own fundamental interests, evaluation of the parties' performance, and expectations of future political action and sudden influences. Especially the last point should be reflected in a good election campaign.

Lars Leiner/Andrea Römmele: Evaluating Election Campaigns, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 28-32

Andrea Römmele and Lars Leiner present criteria for a 'good election campaign'. Crucial are a central theme and the integrity of the leading personal and therefore of the party altogether. An obvious change of central themes would damage the party's integrity. However, at the same time a campaign has to be flexible. A good election campaign has to balance integrity and flexibility.

Andreas Helle: Kampa 02: Strategy of Culture Difference, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 33-36

Andreas Helle was a leading member of the kampa 02, the coordinating office for the election campaign of the social democrats (SPD). Central task of the kampa 02 was to frame the election as a political water shed. Important was to establish a positive evaluation of government activities and reform perspectives as a counter weight to the crises in economic and employment policy. Furthermore they tried to put socio-political issues on the agenda, and point out competences of the SPD and the red-green government. Finally the campaign tried to remember the electoral of the negative results of the conservative government ending in 1998. The crucial factor for winning the election in the end was the focus in the person Gerhard Schröder. He personalized the cultural opposite of the conservative candidate Edmund Stoiber, who gave the impression of a closed, élitist, somehow backward oriented person. Therefore the 2002 election was a water shed.

Gerd Mielke analyses the government activities after the national election 2002. How can the social democrats (SPD) use political rhetoric and political communication to regain initiative. Mielke suggests a powerful social democratic rhetoric, emphasizing social justice and not surrendering to economic imperatives.

Though parties need to modernize their structures, Peter Lösche points out the importance of longstanding party activists. The social democratic election campaign should be based to a larger extent on the existing organisational structure. The campaign was not enough oriented towards loyal voters. Additionally a party in government should coordinate its election campaign in the chancellor's office, which was only the case in the last phase of the campaign.

Reinhard Bütikofer: Architecture of a Green Election Success: A Prominent Team, the Basic Programme, and Favourable Current Issues, FJNSB 1/03, pp. 46-52

Reinhard Büttikofer, party spokesman of The Greens, allows to look at the campaign strategy of the green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). According to his analysis, three factors were crucial: the basic programme, favourable current political issues and a prominent team. The basic programme, which was adopted in spring 2002, established loyalty among party members. The issue agenda in the last weeks of the election campaign were dominated by the (possible) Iraq war and the flood in south and south-east Germany. Finally, the prominent party personnel and especially Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister, had an important mobilizing effect.

Joachim Raschke discusses a scenario for future developments in the green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). Joschka Fischer, foreign minister and prominent front person of the greens, is loosing influence in the party. A new pecking order is going to be established, resulting in problems, chances and risks. Party positions concerning economy and social justice have to be redefined and a new strategic centre has to be established with a new form of personalization, which achieves a closer connection between front personnel and party identity.

Cornelis Stettner: A Strategic Concept for the Green Election Campaign, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 55-61

Cornelis Stettner, staff of the Agency "Zum goldenen Hirschen", was in charge of the green party's election campaign strategy. He describes the process of planning and implementing the campaign. Furthermore he points out crucial aspects of future modern election campaigns.

Michael Spreng: Competence Without Competition: The Election Campaign of the Conservatives in Practice, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 62-67

Michael Spreng was personal advisor of Edmund Stoiber (candidate of the conservative party CDU/CSU) during the election campaign 2002. In his article he allows to look at the CDU/CSU election campaign strategy. It was planned to present Edmund Stoiber as the candidate of the political centre. According to Spreng it was correct to focus the campaign on economic and employment issues. Education as a third issue could not be presented due to resistance in the German Länder. The positive profile of the conservative candidate was permanently combined with a negative image of chancellor Schröder. This strategy and a focus on social justice were mainly successful. The flood in south and south-east Germany and the focus on the question of supporting a war against Iraq were the crucial issues which allowed the SPD to gain ground. These two issues and the crisis of the liberal party shortly before the election resulted in the negative results.

Elmar Wiesendahl: Background and Consequences of the lost National Election for the Conservatives, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 68-73

The conservative party (CDU/CSU) has avoided an honest and thorough analysis of the lost national election 2002. According to Wiesendahl the result was neither accidental nor a result of the two issues, flood and a (possible) war against Iraq. The CSU in Bavaria was very successful resulting in a respectable overall outcome but in north and east Germany the conservatives even lost votes. This mirrors a socio-cultural cleavage in Germany. The electoral of CDU/CSU is different in north or east Germany, and in south Germany. Stoiber was a suitable candidate for the south, though his profile of economic competence was overshadowed by his cultural conservatism, which was important for voters in the north and the east. The election campaign of CDU/CSU altogether was over perfect and under complex. The concentration on economy as the only issue left no room for reaction to sudden catastrophes or other new issues.

Jan-Dietrich Müller: Marathon and Photo-Finish. Strategy and Practice of the Conservative Election Campaign 2002, FJ NSB, 1/03, pp. 74-79

Jan-Dietrich Müller worked for the election campaign of the conservatives and reports on strategies and practice of the campaign. The campaign was based on three pillars: presenting the deficits of the red-green government in the areas of economic, financial and employment policy; presenting own solutions and competences; communicating the two former for a large electorate. These were the criteria to define the strategy. According to Müller the strategy was successful and only a catastrophe (the flood) and the ignorance of political sensibility (SPD-position on the war against Iraq) stopped the success.

Richard Hilmer: Are Only the Flood and the Iraq to Blame for the lost Election for the Conservatives? Strategies and Practice of an Election Campaign, FJNSB 1/03, pp. 80-86

Richard Hilmer, head of the survey institute dimpa, analysis the causes for the defeat of the conservatives in the German national election 2002. Opinion surveys point out that only the flood in south and south-east Germany and the position on a war against Iraq caused a change in the public mood 1.5 months before the election. However, the events were only able to change voting decisions because of a deep scepticism of the CDU/CSU. At no point the conservatives were able to explain why they were better at solving the current problems. This scepticism was not at all surprising as it was presented in earlier surveys. Additionally to these factors the competence team and the concentration on only one issue were also causes for the defeat.

Fritz Goergen: Some Ideas on Strategy and Practice of the Election Campaign of the Liberals in 2002, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 87-88

Fritz Goergen was advisor for the liberal front people Jürgen W. Möllemann and Guido Westerwelle. He presents 13 theses on the causes for the disappointing electoral result of the liberals (FDP). Though he does not base his analysis on the close relationship to Westerwelle, as the author emphasises, he comes to the conclusion that the "strategy 18" (defining the election goal in a radical increase in votes up to the result of 18%) was implemented only half-heartedly by the party leadership.

Hans Vorländer: The Liberals - An Example for Illusion Theatre, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 89-92

For the election campaign 2002 the liberals tried to establish a completely new image of their party. Instead of only being the junior partner of a government they tried to establish an own profile. Their campaign had three main goals: independence from other parties; a party "for everybody"; no government without the liberals. The political communication had an uncommon style based mainly on media thereby presenting the new, dynamic image of the party. According to Vorländer this strategy has failed. Main reasons were, that the party has overdone the media presence as a 'fun party', and the goal conflict between liberal positions and attraction for all.

Manfred Güllner: The Liberals: Between renaissance and extreme right-wing attacks, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 93-96

Manfred Güllner, staff at the forsa survey institute, analyses the election result of the liberals (FDP). According to his findings the distribution of an anti-semitic leaflet by the FDP front person Möllemann shortly before the election and the following scandal had no measurable effects on the liberals' reputation. In the daily surveys during the pre election days the liberals had exactly 7.4% of the votes, their actual election result. The Möllemann affair had no effects.

Tissy Bruns: The Role of Media in the National Election 2002, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 97-99

The journalist Tissy Bruns reviews critically the role of the media in the election campaign 2002. The media were not able to influence opinions besides the loyal voters. In media society the media cannot influence opinions. The media is only a stage for election campaigns. In the end the people decide autonomous about their voting.

Hans Hütt: On the Chances and Limits of Presenting Politics, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 100-103

Hans Hütt, a professional spin-doctor, analyses the parties' PR-strategies. Until the summer the election campaigns were without any political ideas or concepts. Only the flood, the position on a possible war against Iraq, and the report of the Hartz-Commission (on actions for more employment) led to a focus on political issues. In this phase the social democrats were very successful and the campaign gained quality. In this phase, however, the presentation of politics was less important and political content became central.

Andreas Timm: Election Campaign and Success of the Social Democrats in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, FJ NSB 1/03, pp. 104-108

Parallel to the national election also in the Bundesland Mecklenburg-Vorpommern an election took place. Adreas Timm, personal referent of prime minister Harald Ringstorff, analyses the election strategy of the social democrats (SPD) in the Land. Three concepts were central for the campaign: personalization (focusing on the prime minister Ringstorff), issues (economy and employment, social justice), and negative campaigning. The front person of the SPD was an advantage to the conservatives and their candidate Rüdiger Rehberg. However, the social democratic competences in economy and employment policy were questioned, but not in the issue social justice. Important for the election success was also the national election and a mobilization against the conservative candidate Stoiber which also had effects on the election in the Land.